materi ushul fiqih

the fatw§ debated? 93
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Islamic Law and Society 12, 1
Also available online – www.brill.nl
THE FATW$ DEBATED?
SH—R$ IN ONE INDONESIAN CONTEXT
MICHAEL LAFFAN
Abstract
In July 2002 I attended a series of consultative ift§" sessions, known as Bahsul
Masail, held at a general meeting convened by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), an
Islamic organisation that represents traditionalist fiqh in Indonesia. Based
upon close observation of the sessions, I show how consultation with the lay
membership of NU impacted upon four fatw§s drafted by the executive. These
fatw§s discuss NU’s guiding principle, its definition of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-
Jam§#a, the call for SharÊ#a to be adopted by the state, and the permissibility
of suicide bombs as a weapon of war. I argue that although the NU membership
may apply pressure to discuss an issue or to call for a fatw§ and their voices
may well alter the phrasing of a fatw§, the resulting declarations are largely
shaped by the political concerns of its executive board.
This essay is an account of how the leadership of a mass
organization for traditionalist Indonesian Muslims, Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), involves its membership in the formulation of
institutional fatw§s through consultation (musyawarah; Ar. shår§).
The instance of shår§ examined here took place at the Great
Conference and National Consultation (Konperensi Besar dan
Musyawarah Nasional), convened in Jakarta in July 2002, which
resulted in one of the more controversial fatw§s formulated by
NU in its then 75 year history.
The previous essays in this issue and the expanding body of
writings on Islamic law in Indonesia (i.e. Mudzhar 1993; Kaptein
1997; Hooker 2003) show that the close textual study of istift§"
and ift§" tells us a great deal about the historical and contemporary
concerns of Indonesians. My focus here is somewhat different.
Rather than examining the extant corpus of NU fatw§s compiled
Correspondence: Michael Laffan, International Institute for Asian Studies,
P.O. Box 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands, M.Laffan@let.leidenuniv.nl
94 michael laffan
by its executive (i.e. Masyhuri 1997), I will look at how fatw§
texts are now created through a process of shår§. Thus my approach
is necessarily different, being partly ethnographic, and with a
deliberate focus on the construction of identity in an organization
that claims to represent an Islamic tradition to the nation.1 In so
doing, I argue that only by observation of the consultative moment
can one gain a more rounded insight into the concerns voiced
by the constituents of the #ulam§". Further, direct observation
makes it easier to assess how those concerns are recognized,
acted upon, or even ignored for larger political purposes. As I
shall show, such differing responses and their relationship to
national identity and politics were especially apparent at the
National Consultation of 2002.
Background
By the 1920s, Islam’s voice in the Indonesian public sphere
increasingly came to be dominated by advocates of the Egyptianoriented
“modernism” of MuÈammad #Abduh and RashÊd Ri•§,
who emphasised a need to move away from what they presented
as a derivative understanding of fiqh and a fatalistic dependence
on the #ulam§", a fatalism most especially attributed to the practitioners
of Sufism. On Java this form of modernist Islam was
mainly represented by Muhammadiyah, founded in Yogyakarta
in 1912.2
This modernist challenge was keenly felt by the #ulam§" connected
to the network of traditional Islamic schools (pesantren) because
many of their institutions stressed the harmonization of juridical
and mystical aspects of Islamic learning through the teaching of
fiqh and taßawwuf, much as is still done today.3 The pesantren and
1 At first sight I felt that there were similarities in technique shared with
the work of Baudouin Dupret (2003), or at least useful terminologies, such as
“ethnomethodology.” However, Dupret’s material is derived from court
transcripts rather than field observation as is the case here. It is also much
more heavily influenced by psychological theory and focuses on personal
identity rather than institutional form, which interests me here.
2 On the general history of the movement, see Nakamura (1983). Its
connections with Egypt are also disussed in the contributions of Burhanudin
and Anwar in this volume.
3 Van Bruinessen (1990) gives a description of the continuing pesantren
the fatw§ debated? 95
their masters also embodied the physical and temporal continuum
of personal relationships linking shaykh and pupil across the Muslim
world. The ultimate expression of this continuum at that time
was the traditionalist dominance of teaching in Mecca and Medina,
where Southeast Asian pilgrims and scholars would often enroll
in the various Sufi orders represented there.
The 1924 conquest of Mecca by the Wahh§biyya was a major
crisis for these traditionalists, who regarded Wahh§bism as being
indistinguishable from Cairene modernism. Furthermore, the
nascence of the even more doctrinaire Persatuan Islam (Persis),4
the expansion of Muhammadiyah branches beyond Java, and
the collapse of reformist-traditionalist unity on the question of
the survival of the Ottoman caliphate, made the need for a coordinated
traditionalist voice in the public sphere ever more
pressing in the Netherlands Indies.5 In January 1926 a group of
#ulam§" from East Java—led by Hasjim Asj’ari (1875-1947)—
gathered in the port city of Surabaya. The stated aim of this
meeting was to discuss plans to send a delegation of traditionalists
to a planned caliphate conference in Mecca. However the meeting
also saw the formation of a new alliance of scholars, the Nahdlatul
Ulama (Ar. nah•at al-#ulam§", “the awakening of the #ulam§" ”),
which would later spread, like Muhammadiyah, throughout the
islands of Indonesia.
From that time, these two key organizations have faced each
other in Indonesia, each claiming to represent the true voice of
the nation’s believers. It is perhaps emblematic of this competition
over authority that, soon after its founding, NU began to issue
fatw§s at an organizational level. This was done through a forum
called the Bahsul Masail (Ar. baÈth al-mas§"il) or “discussion of
issues,” a consultative session conducted at the first conference
held in Surabaya in October 1926.6 NU has continued to hold
tradition in Java and Indonesia. It should be noted that not all NU kiais are
necessarily members of the orders or encourage the teaching of their techniques.
4 The most commonly cited study on Persatuan Islam, founded in Bandung
in 1923, is that of Federspiel (2001).
5 For a discussion of the impact of Middle Eastern events on Indonesia in
the 1920s, see Laffan (2003: 181-238).
6 It was only following a decision taken at its seventeenth Muhammadiyah
Congress that the rival Majelis Tarjih was established to issue its own fatw§s,
which it commenced doing from 1928 (Ka‘bah 1999: 7; Noer 1973: 80-2).
For observations on the history, structure, and recent workings of Majelis
Tarjih, see the essay of Syamsul Anwar in this theme issue.
96 michael laffan
such sessions on a regular basis ever since and to publish its
decisions for its members, and for Indonesian society at large.
Jakarta, July 2002
Although NU claims the largest mass-membership of any Muslim
organization in the world,7 it is still best seen as an alliance of
scholars, their pupils and extended families with a backbone of
prominent #ulam§" known as kiai. Some of these kiais run pesantrens,
oversee Sufi brotherhoods (tarekat), and even patronise the activities
of a range of non-government organizations. Taken as a whole,
NU is capable of mobilizing large numbers of delegates from
throughout the archipelago. The gathering of 25-28 July 2002
was no exception, with some 500 members in attendance.
This assembly was held at the extensive Asrama Haji complex,
a major gathering point for Indonesia’s annual contingent of
pilgrims. Amidst the swirl of this more local event strode the
kiais, who were instantly recognizable to the gathered members.
Meetings between the kiais and their constituents were recorded
on film and later made available for purchase or, as one seller
of these images put it, “documentation.” The conference itself
was certainly not lacking in this respect, and participants found
themselves provided with a sizeable chunk of documentation
before they walked into the main hall for the opening ceremonies.
Here the former Secretary General, Achmad Bagdja, delivered
an address recounting Indonesia’s parlous situation, and the
imperative for a national political body that truly represents the
aspirations of the people. He compared NU to the People’s
Consultative Assembly,8 pointing out that both encapsulate a
spectrum of factions, all working for the causes of the nation and
with a genuine desire for reform (Ar. ißl§È). Bagdja highlighted
the aim of the congress to discuss matters that impact on con-
7 Although NU claims to have a membership in the tens of millions, this
figure is highly speculative. Even so, recent surveys by the Centre for the
Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat) indicate
that in 2001 approximately 45% of Indonesians questioned identified as part
of the NU community.
8 Indonesia has a bicameral system. The lower house is called the People’s
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the upper the
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR).
the fatw§ debated? 97
temporary society, including the thorny issues of terrorism and
suicide bombing, then seemingly confined to countries abroad.
(This took place before the Bali Bombing of 12 October 2002
and the rise to prominence of the Jemaah Islamiyah). But while
Bagdja evoked the principle of national reform, he also directed
attention to the task of reforming NU itself and reuniting proponents
and opponents of any national role for the organization
as a political party.
By the beginning of the consultative discussions on the second
day, an updated version of source documentation (materi) had
been distributed. This included preliminary rulings of regional
councils, and a second draft of potential fatw§s agreed upon by
the executive at a meeting held in Sukabumi some weeks beforehand.
The various questions were divided into three categories,
Maudluiyyah (topical), Waqi’iyyah Ubudiyyah (practical devotional)
and Waqi’iyyah Siyasiyyah (practical political). Maudluiyyah
matters included the definition of who represents the Ahl al-
Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a (ASWAJA), the affirmation of the NU “guiding
principle” (Ar. khiããa), the adoption of the SharÊ#a by the state,
and the policy of state and regional budget allocation. Broadly
speaking, the use of the Arabic term w§qi#iyya implies that a
question is in need of immediate resolution. Of these, questions
under the Siyasiyyah rubric included issues of national debt,
corruption, terrorism, and suicide bombing, while Ubudiyyah
matters slated such topics as the physical difficulties of the Èajj,
alms, and handling the corpse of a victim of anthrax.
The sessions commenced with the respective committees dispersed
within a large assembly hall. In each case the committee
convened behind a desk taking up one end of an open rectangle
of chairs, which general participants and onlookers were free to
occupy. The descriptions which follow are derived from observations
of four of the sessions: the interlinked doctrinal discussions
on Khittah and ASWAJA, the politically-charged question of
SharÊ#a, and the internationally-relevant matter of suicide bombing.
The Issues and their Protagonists
Whereas other panels started quickly and noisily, a relatively
smaller group of some fifty members milled around the chairs of
the Maudluiyyah session. Within a few moments the table was
98 michael laffan
occupied by the imposing Said Aqil Siradj, the patrician-like
Muchith Muzadi, and Yogyakarta’s urbane Professor Machasin.
Siradj is a graduate of Mecca’s Umm al-Qur§ University and a
controversial figure in NU, given his previous factional (but not
intellectual) opposition to former General Secretary and Indonesian
President Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of Hasjim Asj’ari.
Muzadi, the eminent older brother of current General Secretary,
Hasyim Muzadi, is accorded great veneration because of his
activities spanning the “three generations” of NU. Machasin was
at that time dean of the faculty of arts at the Yogyakarta State
Islamic Institute. Significantly, none has his own pesantren.
Aqil began by taking up a debate passed on from the last
Congress regarding the definition of ASWAJA. Immediately a
member offered a comment from the floor, questioning whether
orthodoxy can be defined at all, whereupon another quipped
that a kiai had urged “back in 1971” that some sort of definition
be reached that would exclude Muhammadiyah. Before any
deliberations could proceed, however, it was noted that Fachruddin
Masturo, a key figure largely responsible for bringing the matter
to the consultation, was missing. It was therefore decided to
move on to discussion of NU’s founding principle.
The Khittah of 1926
Founded in 1926 as a socio-religious organization that sought to
compete with modernists in the public sphere, at various periods
in Indonesian history NU has involved itself in party-politics,
directly or indirectly, and with varying degrees of success or
failure. In the early years of the republic it was affiliated to the
Masyumi (Consultative Council for Indonesian Muslims),9 and
NU cadres had effective control of the Ministry of Religion.
However, due to the dominance of Masyumi by the modernists,
NU withdrew from the coalition in 1952 and contested the 1955
election as a party in its own right. Neither grouping secured a
clear majority.10 In 1973, under the shadow of Suharto’s New
9 Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) was formed by the Japanese
War administration and forcibly combined reformist and traditionalists under
one umbrella, albeit with the reformists in a dominant position. The most
vocal of these were the members of Persis. On the interrelationship and
genealogy of groups in the Persis/Masyumi axis, see Van Bruinessen (2002).
10 In fact the combined Muslim vote nationally was a disappointing 43%,
the fatw§ debated? 99
Order (1966-98), NU was once more forcibly incorporated into
an umbrella “party,” the United Development Party (PPP),
although no political organization had any real chance against
the government machine, Golkar. Frustrated by such impediments
placed before Muslim politics, a group of NU #ulam§", including
Abdurrahman Wahid, called for a “return to the Khittah of
1926” at the 1984 congress at Situbondo, East Java. This effectively
marked their withdrawal from party politics until the fall of Suharto,
at which time the NU-affiliated National Awakening Party or
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) was formed.11 Although the
general election of 1999 finally yielded a short-lived golden age
for NU under President Abdurrahman Wahid, its lasting legacy
has been a division between members along factional lines.
According to the materi supplied by the central committee, the
Khittah issue was phrased as follows:
Ever since NU has been involved in practical politics, whereby NU
became a political party, a great deal of energy has been absorbed
in a process that has detracted from NU’s proper task. The Situbondo
Consultation of 1984 determined that NU should once again become
a societal body (Ar. jam#iyya). The decision of this conference was
affirmed at the 28th meeting in Yogyakarta in 1989. [Still,] there was
a proportion of NU members active in the field of politics, most of
them in the United Development Party (PPP) and a minority in
Golkar. Therefore differing interpretations of the Khittah arose. In
1992 the National #Ulam§" Consultation and Great Conference held
in Lampung dealt with the Khittah in detail. In considering this it
became apparent that the Khittah of 1926 could not be realised in
accordance with its spirit and had once more been distracted by
political interests. Therefore the Central Committee of NU declared
that PKB was a political affiliate of NU. Ultimately, however,
PKB absorbed [NU’s] energy and its proper task was once more
disregarded. …
The question formulated was thus phrased by the central
committee as follows:
In what way might we endeavour to effectuate the Khittah of 1926
in keeping with its concepts and spirit while still being able to
accommodate the aspirations of the members of NU in their role as
citizens participating in national, political and social life?
a percentage never since exceeded. For details of various election results from
1955, see Cribb (2000: 163-4, 173-5, 189-90).
11 This is also not to say that the matter was not controversial in the interim.
See the various articles in Yusuf (1994) for internal perspectives on the
Khittah, NU’s history and ASWAJA.
100 michael laffan
Perhaps as a way of articulating the spirit of NU’s pious forebears,
Muchith Muzadi was called upon to read a speech. However the
spirit of 1926 remained as elusive as ever, because Muzadi is not
blessed with a strong voice nor did he have access to any form
of voice amplification for the first part of his speech. His basic
message, however, was known to all. In sum, Muzadi gave an
outline of the sometimes glorious history of an “extraordinary”
movement. When he was finally given a microphone, he had
reached the point of observing that the Khittah requires interpretation,
although nobody seemed to have a copy of the text
itself. The effervescent Aqil then opened the debate by invoking
the aphorism that one should “preserve what is old and good
while adopting what is new and better.”12 This, he added, should
be done “steering a middle course and with balance” (Ar. bi’ltawassuã
wa’l-taw§zun), while paying attention to sociological
understandings of the three NU principles of Islamic, patriotic
and human fraternity (Ar. ukhuwwa isl§miyya wa-ukhuwwa waãaniyya
wa-ukhuwwa bashariyya).13
Hereafter each participant—#§lim and lay person alike—was
given the microphone and polite attention. One of the first to
speak was Afifuddin Muhajir of Situbondo, who asked if the
Khittah was to be considered by NU as a fundamental (Ar.
mabda"iyya) or contextual (Ar. siy§qiyya) matter.14 He also differentiated
NU from Muhammadiyah by claiming that the sense of
fraternity felt by their rivals was primarily partisan (Ar. Èizbiyya)
rather than revivalist (Ar. nah•iyya). Professor Harun from West
Sumatra said that the issue was a mixture of both fundamental
elements and the need for their recontextualization. Although
he affirmed that NU should abstain from politics, he felt that
12 Ar. al-muȧfaía #al§ al-qadÊm al-ߧliÈ wa’l-akhdh bi’l-jadÊd al-aßlaÈ. When I
interviewed Said Aqil the following day, he made a point of suggesting that
this aphorism may profitably be reformulated as “preserving what is old and
good while producing what is best.”
13 For a discussion of the terms tawassuã and ukhuwwa in the writings of
Achmad Siddiq, see Barton (1996).
14 At the launching of a book on Abdurrahman Wahid the previous evening,
Afifuddin Muhajir criticized the NU activist Husayn Muhammad. In particular
he rejected Husayn’s attack on the traditionalist reliance on fiqh to the point
where it had stymied the development of NU. He also condemned Husayn’s
use of the ideas of the Egyptian exile Naßr \§mid Abå Zayd on the need to
read the Qur"§n contextually.
the fatw§ debated? 101
this stance was open to interpretation. A lawyer from East Java,
Ishomuddin Hadziq, was more equivocal, pointing out that the
idea of jam#iyya was neither specifically political nor social. Besides,
the aim of NU was not to head in one direction but to be, as
some old hands liked to say, “everywhere at once.” He then
related a story about the movement’s founder, Hasjim Asj’ari,
who reportedly had once been asked why the NU was called
nah•at al-#ulam§" rather than nuhå• al-#ulam§" (the second term
implies continuous motion rather than a single instance of rising).15
Although Hadziq did not recount Asj’ari’s answer, the point was
made that NU is unlike a political party in that it seems to lack
a vision for the future and is instead concerned with the social
welfare of every time and place. What then, asked Ishomuddin,
are the aspirations of the membership, its leaders, or indeed the
Indonesian Muslim community?
Aqil then posed a seemingly unanswerable question: What
had been the NU vision for the future back in 1926? The
microphone was now handed to a senior member of NU’s Advisory
Council (Dewan Syuriah), Habib Luthfy of Pekalongan.16 Luthfy
seemed more than a little frustrated with the discussion, which
he regarded as a side-show, and he stated that he would like to
talk about the context of the nah•a: was it an attempt to uphold
the narrow interests of NU or the broader imperatives of the Ahl
al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a? As far as he was concerned, the latter
issue was of far greater relevance, so why not dispense with the
former? Luthfy then urged the delegates to pay greater attention
to the all-important matter of belief (Ar. #aqÊda), at which point
the meeting broke for dinner.
Kiai Fachruddin Masturo was present when the committee
reconvened. Despite his belated arrival and the earlier objections
of Luthfy, debate over the Khittah continued. Miftah al-Rahim
of Malaysia urged that greater attention now be paid to the
15 The term nah•a was borrowed from contemporary Arab discourse by
both Hadrami reformers in the Indies and by a variety of Jawi activists. On
the appearance of this term in the Indies-Arab context, see Mobini-Kesheh
(1999). Intellectual circles in the Middle East have reassessed the term over
the last decades. See Salvatore (1997: 197 ff).
16 This prominent Sayyid is currently president of the NU-allied umbrella
organization for “reputable” sufi orders and was recently elected head of the
Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) for Central Java (see Suara Merdeka, 23
December 2002).
102 michael laffan
debate. With or without the Khittah, he argued, NU needed a
vision, noting that the situation had changed since the time when
NU was an “anti-colonial” movement. Ahmad Syihabuddin of
West Java used this point to return to the question of whether
NU had been founded as a social (Ar. ijtim§#Ê) or religious (Ar.
dÊnÊ) organization; was it for one party or for all people? Similarly
Muhammad Syadid Jauhari of Jember, East Java, begged the
question about the original intention of NU’s founders, contesting
the view of Miftah al-Rahim (and many current members) that
it had initially been an anti-colonial movement, and asserting
that it had been established to uphold the Sunna. At this point
the noise from a nearby panel became deafening, halting debate,
which gave Aqil the opportunity to intervene and urge participants
to avoid emotion and confine themselves to rational discussion
of the text before them.
The floor was now handed to the sole female who would sign
off on the session’s fatw§s, Najichah Muchtarom of Kendal, Central
Java, who quoted Muzadi’s speech in which he stated that, prior
to the general elections of 1997, NU had been not a political
organization but an “extraordinary” one. As she saw it, NU
needed to recall the opportunities lost by its withdrawal from
politics. The movement should accept responsibility for the creation
of PKB and carry out a reinterpretation of the Khittah. Others
were unconvinced. A delegate from Sumatra asked rhetorically
why the Jam#iyya had never been defined as a political or religious
body. Another from Surabaya supported a return to an apolitical
Khittah. While acknowledging that NU had created PKB, he
remarked that this had not reflected much credit on the body
and urged those present to keep their distance from politics, to
keep the good name of NU and to guard the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-
Jam§#a by promulgating “the written” Khittah.
Aqil began to bring the discussion to a close, but allowed
further contributions from a member of the women’s wing, Fatayat
NU, and a younger attendee, Mas Muksid. The first asked how
it could be that NU was “everywhere” when it so obviously
lacked a point of reference. Muksid reminded those present of
the bitter experiences of the 1950s, when NU members had to
deal with the intolerant attitudes of the modernists from Persis.
Aqil concluded that those present clearly agreed that the Khittah
was of key importance as a fundamental question, but emphasised
the fatw§ debated? 103
that, given that NU is an approach (Ar. manhaj) rather than a
clear-cut school of thought (Ar. madhhab), the question remains
of how to situate the organization in relation to party-politics.
Finally, using his authority in a gentle way, Muchith Muzadi
addressed the session, urging all to remember that NU is not a
political organization and that the local politics of PKB in Surabaya
should not stain the entire (national) body.
The Khittah issue shows how problematic it can be for a
“religious” organisation to formulate its place within the nationstate.
How can a body of #ulam§", accustomed to dealing with
knowledge in the form of text, reinterpret a disputed heritage?
Without a universally-agreed vision of the Khittah, the organization
shows evidence of a generational loss of memory. One can see
how the mythology of nationhood has been projected onto the
first generation by its successors, in some cases retrospectively
making them fighters for independence from Dutch colonialism
rather than defenders of the Sunna.17 It is clear, however, that
debating the Khittah is merely a preamble to the seminal question
of what orthodoxy means to some Indonesians today.
The Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a (ASWAJA)
Fauzan Saleh (2001) has recently discussed the issue of competing
definitions of ASWAJA proposed by NU traditionalists and by
modernists, represented mainly by Muhammadiyah and Persis.
Although he correctly identifies a current mood of rapprochement,
as well as NU’s preoccupation with, and Muhammadiyah’s
disregard of, the issue, his conclusion (following the neo-modernist
intellectual Nurcholish Madjid)18 that each grouping represents
17 There is an observable tendency in Indonesian historiography to subsume
all aspects of the archipelago’s Islamic history within the story of a national
struggle with (Dutch) colonialism. For this reason the leaders of diverse Islamic
insurgencies, such as Yusuf Makasar (d. 1699), Prince Diponegoro (d. 1855),
and Imam Bonjol (d. 1864) have been declared “national heroes” (Schreiner
1997); while activists in Mecca, such as Nawawi Banten (1813-97) and Ahmad
Khatib are portrayed as having worked for explicitly Indonesian goals (Chaidar
1978: 96; Hamka 1958: 50-2).
18 A graduate of the Cairo-oriented and avowedly ‘modern’ Gontor pesantren,
Madjid completed his doctoral dissertation in Chicago under Fazlur Rahman
(1911-88) and has been active through his Paramadina foundation and University
in encouraging the rapprochement of liberal Muslims from all segments of
Indonesian society.
104 michael laffan
two halves of the body of orthodoxy in contemporary Indonesia
tends to underplay the intensity of the argument. There remains
a traditionalist insistence that Sunna is as much about doctrine
as it is about the norms of the SharÊ#a. Of course the acrimony
of the past has largely dissipated, but this does not mean that the
#ulam§" of NU have dropped the issue or that they disregard the
linkages between the Islamist end of the reformist spectrum and
the international ambitions of the Wahh§biyya. Indeed the actions
of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah (FKASWJ)
and its spin-off, Laskar Jihad, reignited the debate.19
The question put before the central committee regarding the
definition of ASWAJA was explicitly framed with reference to
the collective loss, or nationalist reshaping, of Indonesian memory
alluded to above; and to the emergence of new groupings claiming
to represent orthodoxy. As mentioned, this issue was discussed
at the thirtieth congress and was forwarded to the central committee
for conclusion. Furthermore, the results of the regional Bahsul
Masail held in Jember on 8-9 June were submitted to the national
committee on 11 June, as duly noted in the materi.
At the moment the concept of ASWAJA is not understood by a large
number of NU members, who think that ASWAJA is the insertion of
a prayer within the morning devotion (sholat subuh), the vocal acclamation
of God’s uniqueness (tahlil), communal prayers of invocation (salawatan),
the doubled call to prayer for Friday prayers, or the additional evening
prayers in Ramadan (tarawih) performed with twenty prostrations.
This is the understanding of a part of the younger generation of NU.
Meanwhile, organizations outside NU have emerged which use the
label of ASWAJA to achieve various ends of their own. This has
created a negative image of the NU Organization and Community
(Jam’iyyah dan Jama‘ah NU). Therefore there must be an immediate
definition of the doctrine of ASWAJA in terms of the understanding
of NU in order to answer the questions:
(a) What is the understanding of ASWAJA in terms of the undertaking
of the NU community?
(b) Can mass organizations other than NU also be termed Ahl al-
Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a?
As with the Khittah issue, no mustaftÊ is mentioned. Instead the
istift§" is encapsulated in the above statement about popular
understanding of ASWAJA as the manifestation of differences in
19 For a discussion of this organization and its paramilitary wing, see the
essay of Hasan in this theme issue.
the fatw§ debated? 105
religious practice. Also attached to the materials from Jember
were the conclusions of a study group held in Jakarta, in 1996,
which offered the following provisional answers:
(a) The Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a are: The Muslims who consistently
and firmly adhere to the Sunna of the Prophet and the way of life
of the Companions in the fields of doctrine, practice, and ethics.
(b) All Islamic mass organizations other than NU can be called Ahl
al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a, provided that they fulfil the above criteria.
These conclusions were accompanied by references to works
of fiqh. Indeed answer (a) is a direct paraphrase of a passage
found in Abå al-Fa•l bin #Abd al-Shakår’s al-Kaw§kib al-lamm§ #a,
a photocopy of which was distributed at the meeting.20 What
was not noted, but which all present would have known, was
that two of the panel members had been instrumental in advancing
the debate. After his return from study in Medina in the mid-
1990s, Aqil expressed very inclusive views about the nature of
ASWAJA in a book that key figures, led by Fachruddin Masturo,
regarded as conflicting with the general position of NU; some
have even accused Aqil of being a Shi#ite sympathiser. According
to Najichah Muchtarom, Aqil adopted a position similar to that
of Nurcholish Madjid, who cited a ÈadÊth according to which all
of the 73 sects (Ar. firaq, sg. firqa) of Islam will enter paradise
with the exception of one (see also Saleh 2001: 65). This is an
inversion of the more commonly cited ÈadÊth according to which
all of the groups that split along doctrinal lines will go to Hell,
with the exception of “the saved group” (Ar. al-firqa al-n§jiyya),
the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a. In the latter ÈadÊth, the Prophet
declared these people to be: “Those who hold to what I and my
Companions hold to” (Ar. hum #al§ m§ an§ #alayhi wa-aßȧbÊ). It is
precisely this “what” (m§) that remains unclear to some.
The phlegmatic Fachruddin now summarised the formal back-
20 On pp. 8-9 of this handout, which lacks publication details, Abå al-Fa•l
states that “The Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a are those who adhere to the Sunna
of the Prophet and the way (Ar. ãarÊqa) of the Companions in respect of religious
beliefs (Ar. al-#aq§"id al-dÊniyya), physical actions (Ar. al-#amaliyya albadaniyya)
and ethics (Ar. al-akhl§q al-qalbiyya).” The other listed references in
the draft are to: Abå Sa#Êd al-Kh§dimÊ al-QånawÊ, al-BarÊqa sharÈ al-ãarÊqa,
111-2; Sayyid #Abd All§h bin #AlwÊ bin \asan al-#Aãã§s, al-#Ilm al-nibr§s fÊ
tanbÊh #al§ manhaj al-aky§s, 41-7; and a ÈadÊth concerning the damnation awaiting
all sects other than the Ahl al-Sunna.
106 michael laffan
ground to the matter, noting that it had been discussed at his
pesantren in Sukabumi before being forwarded to the committee.
After indicating his desire to pursue an answer strongly rooted
in fiqh, he read his own long appendix to the reading materials,
which began in Indonesian (with Arabic glosses) as follows.
1) Recently the [name of the] Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a has been
used by people because there are many who acknowledge that they
are such.
2) It is very important to establish some guidance on the Ahl al-
Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a, especially to equip NU members for daily life.
3) Whereas the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a is not a science [Ar. #ilm],
in laying out this doctrine it is good to refer to the ten principles [Ar.
al-mab§di" al-#ashara] generally termed “the prelude to knowledge”
[Ar. muqaddimat al-#ilm] as put forward by a number of scholars, these
being:
An explanatory text in Arabic now follows:
Every science has ten principles: definition [al-Èadd], content [al-maw•å#],
an anticipated result [al-thamra], excellence [al-fa•l], differentiation
[al-nisba], the originator [al-w§•i#], nomenclature [al-ism], source [alistimd
§d], the divine law [al-Èukm al-shar#Ê], and its issues [al-mas§"il].
All together complement each other and whoever is aware of them
all attains honour.21
Fachruddin provided an Indonesian translation of the above
paragraph, explicating each of the ten principles with further
quotations from Arabic texts. “Definition” was accorded the longest
discussion, based first on the ÈadÊth about the variant destinies of
the sects of Islam and then on several other traditions which
state that the Ahl al-Sunna are enemies of unwarranted innovation
and champions of the truth. Furthermore, they are those who
“adhere to the Qur"§n and that which the Prophet and his
Companions adhered to, as well as the Pious Forebears and
their descendants”—glossed by Fachruddin as the #ulam§" collectively.
In terms of “content,” ASWAJA consists of three elements:
#aqÊda, SharÊ#a, and morals/Sufism (Ar. akhl§q/taßawwuf). Of these,
#aqÊda is primary, as it determines one’s sect. “The anticipated
result” is the ability to distinguish true beliefs from falsehood
and the promise of salvation. He explained “excellence” by
reiterating the same ÈadÊth on ASWAJA, while “differentiation”
21 The Arabic used in the text and cited by Fachruddin is from the Jawhar
al-tawÈÊd. My English translations reflect Fachruddin’s Indonesian version.
the fatw§ debated? 107
meant, quite simply, that these people were different from the
other sects in terms of religious belief.
Fachruddin stepped up his call for a tight definition when it
came to the question of “the originator” (pencipta). While declaring
pro forma that the divine law was shaped by God and His messenger,
the additional penciptas were two theologians; the Sh§fi#Ê Im§m
al-Ash#arÊ (260-324/873-936) and the \anafÊ Im§m al-M§turÊdÊ
(d. ca. 333/944). Of these it was the former who was especially
relevant because he had publicly renounced the rationalist Mu#tazila.
The last four principles were straightforward. “Nomenclature”
entails the variant terms used for the same grouping, whether ahl
al-sunna wa’l-jam§#a, ahl al-Èaqq, madhhab al-ßif§tiyya or the firqa
n§jiyya; “source” refers to the Qur"§n, Sunna and Consensus;
“law” entails the study and enacting of what is obligatory; while
“issues” refers (unclearly) to the practice of the Ahl al-Sunna
defining matters described in terms of religious belief.
Aqil, the first to welcome Fachruddin’s report, noted that while
such a clearly-structured answer grounded in fiqh was important
for NU, all groups could benefit from a simply-worded definition.
The first contribution from the floor came from Dr. Husayn al-
Soha of Cirebon, West Java, who, ignoring the formulation of
the question, asked if ASWAJA is a single movement. In order
to answer this question, he urged the adoption of a new approach
based on an axiology. “If something is a movement, then it
needs to have vision and a mission,” he suggested, adding that
people need to know the meaning of the Qur"§nic phrase “a
blessing for the universe” (Q. 21: 107, raÈmatan li’l-#§lamÊn). He
then recalled that (their old rival and Masyumi spokesman)
Mohammed Natsir (d. 1993) had used such a definition and
therefore included even the Mu#tazila as members of ASWAJA
by virtue of their having a vision. What then, is the vision of NU
in Indonesia? Is ASWAJA a body of knowledge or is it a movement?
Aqil classified this as a question about ontology. Should debate
over the question be rephrased in terms of the idea that ASWAJA
is a movement rather than a sect? In an attempt to redirect the
discussion before it led to further digressions, Aqil invoked the
ever-present sense of history that binds NU’s textual tradition to
the first community of believers, and yet separates them from it
by the gulf of centuries. He did this by reciting the intellectual
genealogy of al-Ash#arÊ—noting, ironically, that there was yet
108 michael laffan
another Mu#tazilÊ on the list of teachers—and recounting that
al-Ash#arÊ had had a dream in which he met the Prophet and
thus learned what the Sunna entails.22 But how, asked Aqil, could
NU claim such an explicit connection to an understanding of
the Sunna?
Afifuddin Muhajir now came forward to affirm his support for
the juridical views of Fachruddin, drawing attention to the
grammatical implications of one particle in the ÈadÊth cited by
Fachruddin, namely the problematic “m§” of definition in the
phrase, “Those who hold to what (m§) I and my companions
hold to.” Here Afifuddin was asking what it was that the followers
of al-Ash#arÊ did that resembled the actions of the first community.
Afifuddin’s support of Fachruddin against Aqil reflects the ongoing
conflict in Indonesian Islam between graduates of Middle
Eastern institutions (like Aqil) and locally-trained #ulam§" from
the pesantren tradition (like Afifuddin) or, better yet, with pesantrens
of their own (like Fachruddin). However, there is another approach
within NU that is embodied by mediators like Professor Machasin,
who gave a historical account of NU and ASWAJA that was
locally focused, explaining how NU had been founded to defend
ASWAJA against attacks from Muhammadiyah. In this sense,
ASWAJA should be identified simply as people who are not
extremists. Furthermore he rejected Muhajir’s suggestion that
members need a strictly juridical approach to the matter, or
indeed that they should be forced to decide whether ASWAJA
entails definition as a manhaj or a madhhab, as proposed by Aqil.
This discussion of historical perspectives gave Professor Harun
an opportunity to compare questions about ASWAJA to the
previous debate over the Khittah and the history of the “inquisition”
(Ar. miÈna) that took place under the Abbasid Caliph
al-Ma"mån (r. 196-218/812-33), who attempted to impose
Mu#tazilÊ doctrine on the Umma.23 Professor Harun made this
analogy with the intention of pointing out that in both cases
ASWAJA should be identified with the majority of believers.
Ironically it seemed that NU was now trying to assert that ASWAJA
22 As one of the anonymous reviewers of this essay noted, resorting to
dreams as a mechanism for obtaining information not available to normal
people is commonly observed in neo-Sufi practice.
23 For a lively account of the miÈna, see Cooperson (2000).
the fatw§ debated? 109
is its sole prerogative, even though Muhammadiyah, with its
clearly-defined attention to the three prerequisites of belief—
#aqÊda, SharÊ#a, and akhl§q—seems to qualify for membership.
Aqil was well-disposed to this view, and even urged its expansion,
implicitly questioning the historical knowledge of many NU
members by pointing out that, as Companions of the Prophet,
ASWAJA by definition must have existed before al-Ash#arÊ and
al-M§turÊdÊ. Indeed he mischievously suggested that an opponent
of al-Ash#arÊ—Ibn Taymiyya—be nominated as a member of
ASWAJA.
The debate now lost its continuity. Malaysia’s Miftah al-Rahim
was concerned that the debate was verging on too great a sense
of partisanship, the likes of which had already led to national
disintegration with the effective loss of the former province of
East Timor in 1999. Dr. Mustamin affirmed that to be a SunnÊ
means having an approach to life that rejects the extremist urge
to accuse others of apostasy. Husayn al-Soha, while accepting
the need for openness, added that there must be limits and
definitions, especially given the existence of people like Ja’far
Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad; he then moved to call
for a definition of ASWAJA that would be sufficiently open to
accommodate the current trend of Islamization of Indonesian
public life in its various forms.
The other sessions had by now concluded, temporarily swelling
the Maudluiyyah audience. Aqil continued to facilitate discussion
and make quips about how doctors and engineers might need to
read more of al-Ash#arÊ’s works, but the intensity of the debate
was gone. At this point final comment was invited before Fachruddin,
who had taken no part in the debate itself, asserted that
he had not said that ASWAJA is a form of knowledge, but rather
its application, and that (regardless of what others had said)
ASWAJA could be a sect, given that, linguistically speaking, any
people may constitute a sect. Just as Aqil was inviting one more
speaker forward, Fachruddin—who had been silent for a while—
brought everyone back to the Khittah and the importance of the
Qur"§nic dictate to “enjoin good and forbid evil.” For better or
worse, the night was at an end.
110 michael laffan
SharÊ#a
The role of SharÊ#a in Indonesia and the status of suicide bombing
had already received attention at the local level. The materi therefore
included draft answers from the branch level accompanied by
relevant documentation from fiqh.
I shall describe the issue of the SharÊ#a, as formulated by the
committee, below, along with some initial responses from the
branches. What was not mentioned in the materi, however, but
which was on the minds of many members present, was that the
question of SharÊ#a and state has plagued Indonesian history
ever since, in the dying days of the Japanese occupation, the
nation’s founding fathers sat down in a series of meetings to
formulate a draft constitution (see Boland 1982). At one of these
meetings, a group of Muslims that included members of NU,
Muhammadiyah and Persis proposed the insertion of a preamble
containing seven words specifying that Muslims are obliged to
practice the SharÊ#a (dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi
pemeluk-pemeluknya). This led to intense disagreement among
members of the committee, and these seven words ultimately
were displaced by what would become (under Suharto) the de
facto doctrine of the Indonesian State. This was Pancasila, the
“Five Principles,” of Nationalism, Internationalism, Representation
through Mutual Consultation and Consensus, Social Justice, and
Belief in the One God.
At various times in subsequent Indonesian history, Islamic parties
and groups have called for the reinstatement of the seven words.
On each occasion they failed to obtain enough support at the
ballot box or in Parliament.24 Furthermore, under Suharto, an
act was passed in 1985 obliging all organizations to adopt Pancasila
as their sole principle. In post-Suharto Indonesia this provision
is no longer being enforced. At the time of the National Consultation,
yet another motion calling for the affirmation of the
lost words of the Jakarta Charter was placed before the MPR,
launched this time by various Islamist groups. The materi states
it thus:
24 For a concise summary of this problematic history, see Van Bruinessen
(1996).
the fatw§ debated? 111
The issue
It is currently being debated whether or not the SharÊ#a should be
effectuated by the state, based on its suggested implementation by
the seven words of the Jakarta Charter included within a part of the
decree of President Soekarno of 1959; that being the reinstatement
of the Constitution of 1945 after the Constituent Assembly failed to
define the basis of the state. The result was factionalization. So it has
been too since the enacting of the Regional Autonomy legislation,25
with many provinces intending to implement the SharÊ#a by formulating
regional acts of legislation.
Questions
a) What is the NU view/attitude in response to this issue?
b) Can the SharÊ#a be carried out by its adherents effectively without
involving the state and in keeping with the aspirations of NU, i.e.,
the enacting of the SharÊ#a in the community and within the context
of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia?
Answers
a) Nahdlatul Ulama is obligated to support the realisation of a human
system of social relations based on the SharÊ#a in order to create a
just and prosperous society.
b) The SharÊ#a cannot be enacted by its adherents in an optimal way
without the involvement of the state in its implementation.
This motion was accompanied by a list of references, followed
by direct quotations from their pages, usually in connection with
Sura 5.26 Furthermore, the tabled answer was identical to that
sent from Jember.
However this was not the only formal response to the question
found in the materi. A letter from the NU board of the newlyautonomous
province of Bengkulu, Sumatra, gave a somewhat
different reaction, problematizing the link between SharÊ#a, state
and local autonomy. Whereas the Bengkulu branch greeted the
discussion of any regional implementation of SharÊ#a positively,
it urged that such changes should be made in keeping with
“nationally valid positive law” effected by the central government,
which should remain in charge of any regulations affecting religion:
The [Bengkulu Branch] Executive both supports and strives for the
upholding of the values and general principles of Islamic teachings in
25 The new legislation on regional autonomy, which devolves the workings
of government from Jakarta to the provinces, came into effect in January
2001.
26 The sources listed, noted in shorthand, are: al-$låsÊ, TafsÊr råÈ al-ma#§nÊ,
[no vol. listed] 145-6; al-TashrÊ# al-jin§"Ê al-isl§mÊ, vol. 1, 228-9, 279; TafsÊr Ibn
KathÊr, vol. 2, 68; Bughyat al-mustarshidÊn, 251-2, 271; al-Im§ma al-#uím§, 334-7,
158; IÈy§" #ulåm al-dÊn, vol. 11, 39.
112 michael laffan
social, national and political life in the Province…. [These include]
the values of al-#ad§la (justice), al-mus§w§ (equality and equal standing),
tawassuã (moderation), taw§zun (balance), murå"a (defence of self-respect),
gotong royong (communal aid), and the like.
This statement was supported by three verses of the Qur"§n
(4: 59; 18: 125; and 3: 159) concerning obedience to God, the
Prophet, and those in authority, following the path of the Lord,
and engaging in consultation. These in turn were followed by
several ÈadÊths on obedience. No references were made to fiqh.
Meanwhile the preparatory committee convened at Sukabumi
provided the following reformulation of the question and an
answer grounded more in terms of social science and the language
of Pancasila and the constitution than in fiqh.
Question
Is NU of the opinion that there is a need to implement the SharÊ#a
in social and political life?
Answer
In accordance with the Constitution, NU has endeavoured and will
continue to endeavour towards the implementation of the SharÊ#a
through two approaches.
a) The cultural approach: by socializing and internalizing the teachings
of Islam through education and by giving an example in one’s private
and family life in the environment of the Islamic community in general
and among NU members in particular.
b) The structural approach: by the process of substantiating the ethical
values and morals grounded in the principles of justice and universal
mercy, within the structure of communal and national life and the
bounds of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia based on
Pancasila.
According to a member of the Siyasiyyah committee, reference
to concepts from beyond the fiqh books—whether Pancasila or
the Constitution—was not so surprising, as Maudluiyyah issues
are generally more open and allow for the wider usage of materials
than do the Waqi’iyyah issues.27 However, as I shall later show,
when the matter of suicide bombing came up in the Waqi’iyyah
forum, a very broad range of source material was also used.
Actual debate over the SharÊ#a, which was strongly contested,
was framed exclusively around the Jember variant. In this regard
delegates were preaching to the converted, urging people not to
see the SharÊ#a merely in terms of physical punishments, nor as
27 Malik Madaniy, personal communication, 1 March 2003.
the fatw§ debated? 113
a dry juridical system. Some delegates pointed to neighbouring
Malaysia, where aspects of the SharÊ#a have been partially codified
in the state of Kelantan, as an example not to follow. On this
point Aqil reminded everyone of the potentially disastrous repercussions
of a state-monopolized SharÊ#a, referring to Saudi Arabia,
where the nexus between state and religion is often used to
silence voices of political opposition.
Machasin also sought to rein in the debate, urging that if it
was impossible to reach a consensus, then the matter should be
deferred and returned once more to the Executive. Others were
not content with any move to rubberstamp the draft. A lawyer
from Lampung, Sumatra, stepped forward to affirm the importance
of “the seven words,” stating that the current judicial system in
Indonesia is in a state of collapse and that all religious communities
need to apply “their own codes of law” to regulate their internal
affairs. Another delegate then presented the standard rebuttal to
the idea of a state allowing multiple religious codes, citing the
example of Egypt, and arguing that if Islamic punishments were
to be enforced, then there would be a widespread tendency among
criminals to convert, or claim conversion, to Christianity, which
in turn would stir up animosity towards Indonesian Christians.
The #ulam§" must assume responsibility for their community,
Muslims need to be reformed, and the problems of Malaysia or
Saudi Arabia are caused by the people themselves rather than
by the faith to which they adhere.
Reading the mood of the meeting, Aqil brought debate back
to the Jakarta Charter. As the discussion circled around this
point, it became clear that Aqil’s position about the need to
abstain from linking SharÊ#a and state—a point that he affirmed
by claiming that NU members (and good Muslims in general)
already enacted the SharÊ#a anyway—was a minority view. For
the bulk of the locally-trained kiai, and especially those close to
the NU power-base of East Java, the SharÊ#a is to be upheld by
the Umma and enforced by the state. The humanist (and once
forcibly-imposed) doctrine of Pancasila did not merit a mention.
Suicide Bombs
Whereas the interconnected issues discussed above clearly reflect
the interaction between the global and the local in current Islamic
114 michael laffan
discourse, one of the more eye-catching sessions in Jakarta was
the matter of “the suicide bomb.” As this was before the Bali
blast of 12 October 2002, the question of suicide (or martyrdom
by explosives) was connected exclusively with the actions carried
out by Hamas, although the general issue also resonated with
ongoing hostilities in the Moluccas. It was also linked to the
public imagination by some Islamists who raised the spectre of
a global “Zionist-Crusader” conspiracy (see Van Bruinessen 2002).
However, the Central Committee formulated this question with
reference to Indonesia’s own struggle for Independence and by
replicating, yet again, the answer provided at Jember.
During the war of independence, there was an excellent young
Indonesian who succeeded in destroying an enemy ammunition dump
by deliberately exploding it so that he too was killed along with the
guards of that dump. In short then: in our opinion this is considered
to be suicide, but in the eyes of the government it is not so. He is
regarded as a national hero and has been honoured as such. He was
Muhammad Toha of South Bandung. Nowadays such actions are
carried out more frequently, especially by the freedom fighters of
Palestine who face the aggression of Israel, may God curse it. Such
acts are known by the expression “the suicide bomb” (Bom Bunuh
Diri).
Legal considerations
We have already declared that suicide (Ar. intiȧr) is forbidden.
Deception is forbidden, unless in a time of war.
The motivation impelling someone to commit suicide is frustration in
facing this life, whereas for suicide bombers it is [political] struggle
or the desire for martyrdom (Ar. istishh§d).
Questions
Is suicide bombing to be regarded as a senseless death or as martyrdom?
Can there be any means of suicide permitted by Islam?
Answers
Essentially suicide is illicit, but if there is a greater public interest for
the Islamic community, [such as] frightening unbelievers, destroying
unbelievers, or demonstrating the care of Muslims for their religion,
then it is licit and may be regarded as martyrdom.
Suicide is licit if carried out with the above intentions.
This provisional answer was supported with long quotations
from inter alia al-QurãubÊ and al-Ghaz§lÊ, justifying the sacrifice
of the individual for the greater good of the community. Once
again the preliminary materials included quite diverse views from
the branches, including another very long rationalisation of the
issue of suicide that seems to have come from the central committee.
This was accompanied by quotations from Hamas spokesmen
the fatw§ debated? 115
and references to the actions of Kamikazi pilots, underlining the
potential confluence of patriotic and religious objectives. Still,
there were differences of opinion, as shown by the less than
enthusiastic reaction of the Central Java branch (Semarang),
which drew its answers from two works entitled al-Futåȧt alil
§hiyya and the Is#§d al-rafÊq:
Answers
The carrying out of suicide bombing, even if it results in the death
of the unbelieving enemy, is still the deliberate killing of one’s self,
and does not differ from normal suicide and is therefore forbidden
[orig. emph.], which means that it cannot be categorized as martyrdom.
That which is accepted by Islam is to be killed as a consequence of
attacking the enemy in Holy War (perang sabilullah)
By contrast, the Ambon-based Moluccan branch, drawing
exclusively on Qur"§nic sources (4: 71, 76 and 61: 10, 14), ended
with a statement uniting the holy and the national.
Suicide Bombing is an action forbidden by Islam as a senseless death/
the death of an unbeliever, even if the action is born of frustration
because of one’s situation, economic problems or personal problems.
The Suicide Bombing allowed by Islamic law is that action carried
out by someone in the context of jihad to defend the religion of Islam
or to save many people or to uphold the honour of people, nation or
religion.
This particular sitting was deftly chaired by Hafidz Usman,
with the assistance of Masdar Mas’udi28 and Malik Madaniy,29
as discussants debated the connection between this issue and the
preceding (and unresolved) definition of terrorism. Unwilling to
countenance any deviation from the printed question, Usman
pointed out that the matter revolved primarily around issues of
terminology, especially about the method of opposing oppression
with a potentially fatal outcome.
Madaniy introduced the contribution from Yogyakarta, but
28 A graduate of the Yogyakarta’s State Islamic Institute, Masdar Mas’udi
is also the founder of the Society for the Development of Pesantren and
Community (PPPM). He is also widely known as an advocate of women’s
rights.
29 Malik Madaniy is a senior staff member of the Faculty of SharÊ#a at
Yogyakarta’s State Islamic Institute and a staunch member of NU. Nevertheless,
a glance at a brief article he has written recently, entitled “Shår§ as an important
element of democracy,” shows that his reading includes one or two authors
who would not be popular with his peers, e.g. Maulana Maududi, RashÊd
Ri•§ and Ibn Taymiyya. See Madaniy (2002).
116 michael laffan
expanded on its largely unstated ramifications to bring it into
line with the majority view. Suicide remains suicide unless the
clear objective is the defence of Islam, meaning that its use should
be restricted to the context of jihad, and then only in the case
of the strictest necessity. Even then, one’s intention (Ar. niyya)
must be absolutely pure (Ar. khalÊßa) and care must be taken to
identify the target. This seemed acceptable to the majority, but
they still grappled with the term “suicide” itself. One person
announced that the term “suicide bomb” needed rethinking, as
it is a “Western term” used to degrade Islam. He urged that the
question be rephrased more generally in terms of a war of selfdefence,
in which all methods are deemed available. Usman
intervened quickly to insist on a simply-worded response that
would focus on the key point of the underlying intention of such
actions, urging the participants to remember their ramifications.
Most people agreed to this, settling for the simplest reading of
the question and emphasising the imperative threat required for
self-defence. Still, there were voices of discontent. One came
from Ubaedy Fadhil,30 who reminded everyone that this was less
a question of theory than of fact. They were all talking about
Palestine weren’t they? To kill Muslims is wrong, whether as
willing victims or as innocent bystanders. Another then rose to
point out that the Palestinian situation may be justified in legal
terms by considering the bomber not as a warrior, but as a
prisoner seeking to escape and uphold the spirit of Islam. The
next speaker came back to a more aggressive reading, quoting
the popular Islamist journal Sabili; he observed that a previous
issue had held up the example of a hero of the first civil war of
Islam who had attacked, single-handedly, an enemy fortress, “killing
until he was killed.” Madaniy then brandished the tabled issue
in his hand, reminding everyone that the question under discussion
was not simply about Palestine. He then related two other ÈadÊths
which speak about the gains to be reaped from battle, each
setting a reasonable precedent for regarding suicide missions as
martyrdom. But Usman trumped these ÈadÊth by invoking a superior
source, asserting to those present (and perhaps for my benefit?)
that the only jihad mentioned in the Qur"§n, is that against the
30 This individual is an important financial backer of NU. Currently a
member of the al-Hikam group of Malang, he is connected to the tobacco
industry and has spent time abroad, including Australia and the USA.
the fatw§ debated? 117
self. Another delegate then emphasised the need for communal,
rather than personal, benefit from the action in question, while
another participant from the island of Sumba came back to the
question of what to call a self-destructive act. He offered five
options: Jihad Bomb, Struggle Bomb, Self-Defence Bomb, Communal-
Defence Bomb, and Defence of the Truth Bomb.
The general flow of comments resembled less a debate than
an opportunity to air opinions—and not necessarily in a logical
order. Some participants focused on the helplessness of the
bombers, others spoke of the technical requirement of mental
and spiritual preparation. Another, from South Sulawesi, reminded
everyone yet again that suicide is wrong, and that believers should
concentrate on good works. This is a national issue for people
without any choice, and at this point he cited no less an authority
than then Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. Throughout
the debate, however, Usman returned time after time to the
exact wording of the materi, for there was little doubt that, once
the delegates dispersed for the evening, it would be the committee’s
search for an appropriate text that would seal the issue of how
to talk about the suicide bomb.
The Preliminary Results
Almost immediately after the sessions broke up, the sub-committees
convened to formalize their findings and, by the following morning,
these had been agreed, signed, printed and circulated before
being read to a surprisingly docile crowd. And although these
findings had not yet been officially ratified by the General
Secretariat, they appeared to betoken, at least for that moment,
NU’s official view. Thus the obvious question to be asked by this
essay is: “How has the shår§ affected the process of ift§" ?” If we
compare the resultant drafts with those presented to the assembled
delegates in the materi, we can see that the impact has been
uneven.
Affirmation of the NU Khittah of 1926
[Q] In what way might we endeavour to effectuate the Khittah of
1926 in keeping with its concepts and spirit while still being able to
accommodate the aspirations of the members of NU in their role as
citizens participating in national, political and social life?
[A] The resolutions of the Khittah of 1926 are still relevant at this
time. Nevertheless, in their implementation there needs to be considered
118 michael laffan
interpretation on the part of the PBNU so that it can accommodate
the aspirations of NU members and build solidarity among them.
Therefore, the National Consultation of #Ulam§" will urge the PBNU
to activate an NU Political Bureau in order to function optimally.
Here we see that the debate has affected the draft answer, and
a compromise between a social and a political identity has been
proposed as an attempt to reconcile the pro- and anti-political
factions of the movement. The committee also somehow recognizes
that an imagined text of 1926 remains valid in spirit, but should
be subject to interpretation. Still, the statement issued is a weak
and contradictory proposal that seeks to disavow a formal interest
in politics while establishing a subordinate body to deal with the
issue. There is, not surprisingly, no religious text evoked to justify
this declaration, and it is by no means a resolution to the problem.
Debate will most likely continue with this “fatw§” being but part
of the preamble to the next.
The Doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a
[Q] What is the understanding of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a in
the context of an all-encompassing undertaking of the SharÊ#a?
[A] The understanding of the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a is [embodied
by] the person who holds fast to the Qur"§n and who follows every
single thing [mengikuti segala sesuatu] carried out by the Prophet, his
Companions, the Pious Forebears, and their successors. [Arabic follows:]
(ahl al-sunna wa’l-jam§#a huwa man atba#a wa-tamassaka bi-kit§b All§h wabi-
m§ #alayhi al-rasål ßall§ All§hu #alayhi wa-sallama wa-aßȧbuhu wa-bi-m§
#alayhi al-salaf al-ߧliÈ wa-t§bi#uhum.) In its undertaking, Nahdlatul Ulama
follows: [1] one of four juridical schools (\anafÊ, M§likÊ, Sh§fi#Ê, and
\anbalÊ) in the field of SharÊ#a; [2] Im§m Abå \asan al-Ash#arÊ and
Im§m Abå Manßår al-M§turÊdÊ in the field of #aqÊda; and [3] Im§m
al-Junayd al-Baghd§dÊ and Im§m al-Ghaz§lÊ in the field of akhl§qtaßawwuf.
[Q] Can mass organizations other than NU also be termed Ahl al-
Sunna wa’l-Jam§#a?
[A] They may be or they may not be, depending on whether or not
the mass organization is in accord with the above understanding.
If we look at form alone, the above statement is far more
readily termed a fatw§. The phrasing of the question has been
subtly altered, though not in a way that affects its meaning, by
defining the SharÊ#a as an all-encompassing field rather than as
a set of “practices.” The first part of the answer also differs from
the Sukabumi draft, and now reflects the terminology of the
debate. It is now also preceded by the direct quotation of an
Arabic text, followed by a much more rigorous expansion of the
the fatw§ debated? 119
definition stating the need for a juridical affiliation mediated by
the voices of classical orthodoxy. Fachruddin has apparently won
the public argument with Aqil that orthodoxy is as much about
doctrine as practice.
The upholding of the SharÊ#a in Indonesia
[Q] What is the attitude of NU towards efforts to uphold the SharÊ#a
in Indonesia, whether in individual life or in communal and national
life?
[A] NU has worked and will continue to work to uphold the SharÊ#a
by two approaches, namely the cultural and structural approaches.
(a) The cultural approach is enacted by means of socializing and
internalizing the teachings of Islam through education and by
example, whether in private or communal life.
(b) The structural approach is done by means of endeavouring to
realise the substance of the ethical values and morals based on the
principles of justice and universal mercy within the structure of
communal and national life and the bounds of the unitary state of
the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.
In this instance the debate may be assessed as having had only
token significance. Given that so many voices raised in the shår§
welcomed the idea of the state being involved with the SharÊ#a,
a notion that is politically difficult for NU, the question itself has
been altered, allowing the committee to assert its view from
above that Islamization should be a process of socialization rather
than a state initiative. The ideal principle of the SharÊ#a is upheld,
but it is a distant and lofty example—certainly far too lofty for
the current state, with the result that NU members should continue
to act as role-models for their fellow Indonesian citizens.
Combating oppression by suicide
[A slightly altered version of Muhammad Toha’s story is included as
in the materi.]
[Legal considerations] We have already declared that suicide (Ar.
intiȧr) is forbidden.
Deception is forbidden, unless in a time of war. The motivation
impelling someone to commit suicide is frustration in facing this life,
whereas for suicide bombers it is [political] struggle or the desire for
martyrdom (Ar. istishh§d).
[Q] What is the view of the SharÊ#a towards suicide bombing? Is
suicide bombing regarded as a senseless death (mati konyol) or martyrdom?
[Q] Can there be any form of suicide permitted by Islam?
[Rephrased] Question: What is the view of the SharÊ#a towards actions
of self-sacrifice, even to the point of death, in order to struggle for
fundamental rights (hak-hak dasar; Ar. al-•aråriyy§t al-khams) which are
legitimate?
120 michael laffan
[A] Essentially suicide is a great sin in Islam which is forbidden by
religion. Nevertheless, acts of suicide as self-sacrifice to the point of
death can be validated, and even regarded as martyrdom, provided:
(a) They are truly intended to protect or struggle for the fundamental
rights of the majority which are legitimate, and not with the intention
of bringing disaster to the self.
(b) They must be convinced that there is no other means available
that is more effective or less risky.
(c) They must target only those whom they are convinced of being
the brains and enactors of the oppression itself.
Clearly, the debate has had a direct impact on the issue of
suicide bombing, leading to the complete reformulation of suicide
in terms of self-sacrifice and as a defensive measure. This draft
fatw§ brought NU into line with other authorities on the global
stage and while there may have been resistance to having the
debate on suicide bombing in the first place, it cannot be ignored
that the sympathies of many Muslims extend to their fellow
believers beyond their own national borders.
Conclusion
Close examination of the fatw§ texts seen at either side of the
debates of the Bahsul Masail sheds valuable light on the ways in
which the act of ift§" by consultation and committee engages a
traditionalist knowledge of fiqh with the modern, often national,
concerns of Indonesians. I would argue that it is only through
such juxtaposition that an insight may be gained into the internal
tensions within NU. This is most notable in the moment of
disagreement that was visible when the issue of SharÊ#a was raised,
which was subsequently elided in the resultant fatw§. And whereas
this elision would pass unnoticed in an analysis of text alone, or
in consequent reportage of the position of NU regarding Islamic
law and the state, it helps contextualize the very real enthusiasm
for Islamic Law voiced in recent surveys of Indonesian public
opinion made by Mujani and Liddle (2004).
I would also argue that attention to these debates, when
considered in relation to each other much as they occurred at
the Bahsul Masail, demonstrates that NU and its membership
are still trying to resolve their identity on a national stage while
simultaneously appealing to a deeper tradition that binds them
to the first Muslim community in Medina. In terms of resolving
the fatw§ debated? 121
these identities, there seems to be little ambivalence about using
shår§ and ift§" to deal with both the internal question of NU’s
mission and that of the Ahl al-Sunna more generally. For both,
the rival Muhammadiyah movement and other SalafÊ movements
serve as a useful counterpoint, evoked by further reference to
the bugbears of the Saudi state or even neighbouring Malaysia.
Given the implicit framing of the NU fatw§ in terms of a
“traditional” method enacted in a specifically national environment,
the default mustaftÊ and audience remain recognizably Indonesians,
but Indonesians alive to the theology of al-Ash#arÊ and the mysticism
of al-Ghaz§lÊ. There is no doubt that the shår§ convened by
these leaders is important and a demonstration of an organization
that gauges the opinions of its members, but their attention to
the membership is recognized more in the terminology of the
fatw§ than in the core argument presented. Regardless of what
occurs in the context of the shår§, the actual answer will more
usually be formulated by the executive with an eye to NU’s
long-term strategic views as a socio-political organization that
seeks to represent Islam for the nation.
After each Great Conference the Central Committee must
ratify its decisions, which are then disseminated among the
membership. By this time, the kiais will have returned to their
constituencies to explain the decisions taken, which then filter
down from the pesantrens to the community at large. Certainly it
did not take long for the Suicide Bomb fatw§ to hit the press.
Both Sabili and The New Straits Times were quick to seize on the
obvious ramifications of the fatw§. Malik Madaniy was forced to
point out that it is intended only for war time situations, and
that women and children are not legitimate targets,31 while NU
General Secretary Hasyim Muzadi explained that this fatw§ is a
“low level religious order” that was not issued by any of the
“influential” Muslim clerics within the organization and that
was yet to be ratified by the central committee.32 NU may represent
a global faith, but its leaders have a close eye on the national
context and its regional implications.
31 Malik Madaniy, personal communication, Yogyakarta, 27 February 2003.
32 This statement was made in The Straits Times Interactive (31 July 2002)
and was quoted by Kees van Dijk in a paper given at the meeting at which
these essays were first presented.